Ghazalie Shafie and the M’sia factor
Published on: Sunday, September 19, 2021
By: David C C Lim and Syn Chew
Text Size:
Ghaz with Cobbold members: Architect of the Malaysia Plan.
Few Malaysians know of the role played by the same person in the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.
In a private interview in 1985, the Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, did not have kind words to say about this man who had assisted him to carry through the Malaysia project in the early sixties and then served as an exemplary permanent secretary under him.
“That fellow died a thousand deaths when his private plane crashed in 1982,”said the Tunku rather unkindly in a taped interview with politician and author, Abdullah Ahmad in 1985. “Ghazali has suffered more than anybody has suffered but he is alive today….[when he crashed] with two men by him in that jungle, lost in the jungle, he must have been a very, very frightened man indeed.” (Abdullah Ahmad, Conversations with Tunku Abdul Rahman (Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2016.))
In the interview, the Tunku had other uncharitable things to say about his right hand man even though the two had together, like midwives, helped to bring forth Malaysia. The Tunku said he doubted the latter’s sincerity, due to an incident which he could still recall vividly after all those years:
“[To fight for independence from the British] we had to have as many civil servants as possible in the party. It was Razak’s idea that he and I go to see Ghazali. So we went to see Ghazali who was staying at New Hotel in Princes Road in Kampong Baru. I asked him to join Umno. He said, “No.” So I asked Razak to leave with me immediately, saying, “Let’s get out of here before I lose my temper.”
Ghazali’s take on the same encounter was different. Alluding to the incident in his Memoir on the Formation of Malaysia (Penerbit Universiti Kebangasaan, Malaysia, 1998), he had told the Tunku he could not be a politician, but could do better to serve the politicians as a civil servant, adding that he had a quick temper, and could not easily suffer fools.
The Memoir is his detailed account of how Malaysia was realized after the Tunku floated the idea in May, 1961. Ghazali tells of how he learned from MacDonald that the British Colonial Office had, even before the Pacific War, wanted to rationalize its position in Malaya. MacDonald had favoured a two-staged federation, first among the Borneo territories, then with Malaya and Singapore. Ghazali thought it would be more expedient for the British to surrender jurisdiction over the Borneo states to a Federation that would include the Borneo states and Singapore as a package.
The needling issue then was that the British had wanted Singapore to merge with Malaya as soon as possible due to the increasing strength of the Chinese educated trade unionists and leftists in the island. Both Singapore and Malaya were then very important to their political, security and economical interests.
Lee Kuan Yew likewise wanted a speedy merger for the same reason. The Tunku, however, was reluctant to proceed unless he had the Borneo Territories “in the bag” so to speak. This the British were reluctant to promise without some indication from the Borneo peoples that they were amenable to the Malaysia idea.
To add to the conundrum, the Borneo people had no voice of their own; they had vaguely signaled that they would go along with the advice of local British officials. Ghazali suspected that these officials were trying to delay the project:
“Local colonial expatriate officers too had their vested interests not necessarily selfish but well meaning and idealistic. They had a special feeling for the primitive peoples and the Chinese they had been subjugating.”
The British finally gave in, with a well-watered down proposal that transfer of the sovereignty should be ‘subject to the support of the peoples of the Borneo territories.’ This led to the creation of a commission that would look into the wishes of the people in those territories with respect to the concept of federation with Malaya and Singapore.
Ghazali, then the “contact man” for the stakeholders was appointed as one of the members of the Cobbold Commission that was given the task to sound out the sentiments of the Borneo peoples.
He took to the task like a duck to water and nursing an ill-concealed agenda of his own.
Travelling to the interior of North Borneo and Sarawak to sell the idea of Malaysia, he had come to know and understand the Borneo peoples better than the rest of the Malayans at the time.
“His untiring visits and meetings with the leaders in the Borneo Territories and also in London just before the final signing of the Cobold Commission Report made it possible for the Malaysian Plan of the Tunku a reality…” (Tan Sri Herman Luping, The Daily Express, January 31, 2010).
The Tunku, however, downplayed his secretary’s role in the negotiations with the various parties leading to the formation of Malaysia.
“Ghazali is nothing. When I did not make him the chief secretary to the government, he protested…..That is why Ghazali had never forgiven me.”
In recalling events that happened more than twenty years ago, the Tunku could be forgiven for remembering only his own only pivotal role in the negotiations leading to the formation of Malaysia. It is perfectly understandable that one would gloss over whatever one’s subordinates had done and to see them as merely doing the necessary preparatory work to set the scene for the momentous decisions to be made thereafter.
However, the Tunku’s dismissal of the role played by his secretary goes beyond mere indifference; it seems to have been motivated by more than just a desire to set the record straight. It also seems to reveal a palpable resentment that is almost verging on animosity toward his former secretary. He continues:
“He is a clever man and he seems able to float under all conditions. ….. He was only my permanent secretary. … he used to prepare drafts for my speeches..I had never used his drafts…people had the impression after talking to Ghazali that he initiated, formulated, orientated and carried out our foreign policy. I can put the record straight now that he never did such things. ..He was a good civil servant although rather Machiavellian in nature.”
True to the nature of his frank ‘Memoir’ Ghazali himself admitted to resorting to bluster and bluff especially when tackling the Borneo people. In the ‘Finale’ of his book he described how he manipulated both Stephen Kalong Ningkan and Temenggong Jugah to get them to agree to have another candidate as governor in place of the Temenggong who was nominated by both the British and the natives.
After learning of the nomination of Temenggong Jugah, the Tunku had called an emergency Cabinet meeting and denounced the nomination as interference from the British, saying that he did not recognize the ‘Ningkan Government’, and would leave Sarawak behind if a Malay was not nominated. He said he could not countenance a governor who could neither read nor write.
Ghazali succeeded in what he calls his “most Machiavellian ploy in the whole Malaysia exercise”, to get both Ningkan and the Temenggong to agree to another choice of governor, and effectively set the rickety wagon of the proposed federation on its way again.
In the final sentence in his book, he says modestly: “This as I recall is the story of the formation of Malaysia in matters I had personally been concerned with.”
Given the chatty nature of the interview, with the interviewer fielding leading albeit probing questions, the recollections drawn by the interviewer could go in the direction suggested, whether consciously or subconsciously.
This appears to be what happened.
Abdullah Ahmad the interviewer made it clear that he did not like Ghazali, and understandably so, as he was put in detention under the draconian Internal Security Act in 1976 on suspicion of having ‘Marxist leanings’ during the tenure of ‘the much loathed’ Home Minister, Ghazali.
In his thumbnail sketch of the characters in the Malaysian political landscape in the section of the book entitled, “Memories and Reflections” Abdullah Ahmad pours out his rancour on the former home minister. According to him, Ghazali was ‘the most despised minister.’
A former scholar in the famous Malay College in Kuala Kangsar, Abdullah Ahmad condescendingly observed that Ghazali, was a “deprived but diligent boy”, son of a government mandor in charge of collecting mosquito larvae for the anti-malaria campaign. He added that the boy had served as interpreter for the Japanese, who must have been ‘very, very fond of him because they trusted him and allowed him much freedom.’
The insinuation is there, a happy collaborator of the Japanese. To be fair, it was a fact during the Japanese occupation the Malays were generally favoured by the Japanese to serve as administrators and also in the police force.
Abdullah Ahmad thought him a tyrant too, observing: “between 1976 and 1981 [Ghazali] was the most powerful man in the country, the de facto prime minister, the de facto defence minister and the de facto minister of foreign affairs.”
“Ghazali’s dominant features were egotism, rudeness and rancour. He cursed his staff and all who did not embrace him. When a man’s heart is full of resentment, and vindictiveness dominates him, he becomes extremely dangerous.”
Abdullah Ahmad’s overtly biased assessment of the former foreign minister’s career was derived from a very narrow time span between two dates, as he puts it:
“The dates of November 3, 1976 and July 30, 1981, should stand out as landmarks in the life of Ghazali Shafie, the much-loathed former home affairs minister. The first was his victory day, and the second, a day of humiliation.”
The first was the day when he was incarcerated with several others for being “crypto-communists” by the home minister, and the second was the day he was released by Dr Mahathir when the latter became the PM in 1981. To Abdullah, the day of his release was a day of humiliation for Ghazali.
It is clear that there is a divergence of political ideology between the two who were separated not only by time, but it seems also by culture. Ghazali had served in the colonial administration and had been sent for further studies in the UK. Sent by the Tunku to India he had met Malcolm MacDonald who had been posted there as the British High Commissioner after serving as Commissioner-General in Malaya. Though he had refused to join Umno, he was no doubt involved in other ways in the struggle for the independence of Malaya.
Abdullah Ahmad too was a self-made man. Entering politics early in life, he served under the Tunku from 1957, then worked his way up to become the secretary and political advisor of Tun Razak before he was incarcerated. Released in 1981, he went to the University of Cambridge, where he graduated with a Masters of Letters for his thesis on the Tunku. He was made a fellow of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University. His credentials as a political commentator were therefore formidable.
“Conversations with the Tunku” was based on his interviews with the Tunku over a period of time from 1982 to 1984. Written in 1985, it was not published until 2016 after most of the major players mentioned had left the scene, the Tunku in 1990, and Ghazali in 2010. Abdullah Ahmad himself passed away in 2016.
The originals of the tapes are kept at Cambridge, but copies kept at the National Archives of Malaysia, are accessible for research purposes after the demise of the author. They would no doubt be an invaluable resource for studies on Malaysian history for future researchers.
In his introductory piece to the book, Tunku Abidin Muhriz describes the conversations as espousing “the contrasting ideological convictions of the speakers, providing a palpable tension underlying some of the conversations.” Another recurring feature in the conversations according to Tunku Abidin is the “notion of the centrality of the Malays in governing the country.” He notes that the author was “the first to connect concept of Malay overlordship ( p. 22), then translated by the Malay press as ‘Ketuanan Melayu’, to the social contract [sic] of 1957’”.
That appears to be the position Abdullah Ahmad wanted the Tunku to commit to, among other things, during the interview. However, the Tunku, while accepting the primacy of the Malays in the governance of the country, refused to go as far as Malay supremacy. Abdullah suggested the idea to the Tunku obliquely, with a vaguely worded question the intent of which, nonetheless appeared to have been understood by the Tunku:
Abdullah Ahmad: “We are, as you said, not a united nation, so could we never be a leader?”
The Tunku answered:
“Well, if all the races in our country became Malaysians, like the immigrant races in the United States have become Americans instead of still being divided into Bumiputra, Chinese or Indians, Malaysia would be a strong and unified nation – even powerful country..”
It is an equally evasive answer, but the Tunku refused to affirm the hinted proposal of the Malays retaining leadership for perpetuity, in the way Abdullah saw it.
In his Afterword, Abdullah slips in almost surreptitiously his beloved concept of social contract as having been accepted by the Tunku:
“In the event, Tunku was a cosmopolitan man and, thankfully, patriotic Malaysian. Only on the Malay monarchy, Malay special position and privileges, and the social contract, was he unbending and unbendable. Nothing was to jeopardize their security.”
It is here, on the question of leadership and nation building, that the Tunku, Ghazali and Abdullah, each espousing varying degrees of racial sensitivity, were at cross purposes.
Apparently taking a more inclusive approach, Ghazali, one of the proponents of the Rukunegara, appeared to be closer to the aspirations of the Tunku in terms of the governance of a multi-racial Malaysia.
In an article on “Creating a Malaysian nation” in his book, Malaysia, Asean and the New World Order (Penerbit University Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000), Ghazali outlines his concept of a multi-racial country “cemented with national unity”, without which, he says, “merdeka would be an empty word.”
To him the foundation of national unity would be “the spirit of power-sharing” which would nurture and strengthen such unity. This common vision is expressed in the Rukunegara, the tenets of which are:
- Belief in God;
- Loyalty to King and Country;
- Upholding the Constitution;
- Rule of Law and
- Decorum and Morality.
Regrettably the Rukunegara is today largely ignored, if not wholly discarded by our politicians who no doubt would be found to be in flagrant breach of the last three, if not all of its tenets.
Ghazali also advocates the evolution from “warganegara” to a “bangsa Malaysia”. But he is under no illusion that it would be easy, he cautions: “the creation of a band of people to be known as Malaysian Nation as a natural process out of the various races in anthropological terms would require a time-frame and societal engineering.”
Abdullah Ahmad, on the one hand, equates the Constitutional “special position and privilege” of the Malays as Malay supremacy.
This interpretation ignores the circumstances in which the terms were included in the Federal Constitution of Malaya. Furthermore, the narrow interpretation adopted by him as giving Malays “predominance” in the country under the emotionally charged term of “Ketuanan Melayu” would never have been accepted by the peoples of the Borneo territories if that had been the intention of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia. It was rightly rejected by the Tunku.
Ghazali’s interpretation of the “special position and privileges” of the Malays, on the other hand, accords with the historical background of the stipulation and should be the more accurate and, therefore, legal construction. In the Chapter, “Crafting the Future” in his book, he has this to say on the inclusion of these special rights:
“The British High Commissioner administering the Federation of Malaya was made responsible for safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities.
The safeguards referred to four subjects, namely;
- Malay Land Reservations.
- Quotas for admission to Public Services
- Quotas in respect of issuing licences or permits for the operation of certain businesses
- Preference given to Malays in the offer of scholarships and other educational assistance.
These special rights and privileges were meant to serve as “an insurance for the well-being of the nation”, says Ghazali, and “the arrangement in due course would be unnecessary after a strong middle class with common values has been nurtured and the incidence of poverty greatly reduced.”
Despite the negative sentiments expressed by the Tunku on Ghazali in “Conversations”, it could be said that the Tunku and Ghazali shared a common approach in the governance of a multi-racial Malaysia. With hindsight it is clear that the ruling clique in the dominant party since 1981 has adopted the concept of “Ketuanan Melayu” and ran with it much to the detriment of the whole country.
The letter “M” in relation to the leadership of this country could now more fittingly be said to be Mephistophelean rather than Machiavellian, in the sense understood by both the Tunku and Ghazali given the downward slide the country has taken, both in morality and in integrity.
In his essay, “Leadership, Development, Evolution of Culture,” Ghazali observes:
“[Malaysian leadership] believe in consensual democracy and sharing of power…Umno alone could have sufficient majority to run the country with the others in opposition. That, however, could never bring about national unity without which there could be no stability which is a sine qua non for development.” (Malaysia, Asean and the New World Order, p. 321).
Ghazali’s notable role as the country’s outspoken and widely respected foreign minister apparently did not count much with Abdullah Ahmad, himself a former envoy, much less his contribution as a go-between negotiator in the years leading to the formation of Malaysia. Yet, no study of both the formation of Malaysia and the nation’s foreign policy during the country’s formative years would be complete without an assessment of the role played by Ghazali in both.
In the final analysis, Ghazali had played a greater role in the negotiations leading to the formation of Malaysia than that which the Tunku was wont to grant him, and so also with his record as foreign minister of the newly minted federation.
Indeed, the New Straits Times of November 25, 2015, reported that the Inaugural Asean People’s Awards committee had given a posthumous award to the “diplomat extraordinaire”, the late Ghazali Shafie. According to the report, the former home and foreign minister, known for being an ‘expert in international affairs, and his flamboyant and dashing style’ had helped the country’s first prime minister shape the formation of Asean, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. As foreign minister, continues the report, he was instrumental in steering Malaysia “on a neutral course of non-alignment.”
In an essay entitled “In Search For a New World Order in the Post-Cold War Era” in his book, Ghazali sees through the machinations behind big power politics, particularly the covert actions of the United States, a remarkable observation that has been borne out by events to this day:
“[During the Cold War much leeway was given to Japan and the Asian Tigers to industrialise and prove the superiority of the free market system to communism] All these require a piece of the world market which means that with their competitive edge the US economy will be in jeopardy. Hence the US turned on the Cold War against her friends and allies, using selected issues depending on the country concerned with the sole objective of slowing down their industrialization programme (our italics). Japan is continuously being bashed, China is attacked regarding Tienanmen Square, Malaysia on Labour Laws, Singapore for the caning of an American delinquent, Indonesia on Tim-Tim (East Timor); South and North Korea and Taiwan are subjected to all sorts of pressures which are aimed to stultify the industrial growth of competitors. Even Australia is being noted for her high pollution of the environment. Trade relations are being subjected to irrelevant trade issues.” (Malaysia, Asean and the New World Order, p.309).
Domestically, as foreign minister he had also set high standards within his ministry. A former staff remembers:
“His penchant for morning briefings by his officers left the Ministry with a legacy of ‘morning prayers’, so named because before going to those briefings officers would offer up a quick prayer that they would not be called upon by the great ‘King Ghaz’”.
In the obituary published in the Daily Express, 31 January, 2010, Tan Sri Herman Luping wrote: “On hindsight, we can indeed say that Tun Ghazali was the architect of the new Federation of Malaysia. We cannot say that he “singlehandedly made the Malaysia Federation”, but nearly.”
This appears a remarkable tribute, when one considers Dr Luping’s own view of how national unity should be achieved. He quotes Dr Chan Chee Beng on the issue of national integration:
“There should be no attempt to suppress ethnic culture or to impose Malay culture on non-Malays. The crucial factor in achieving integration is to ensure greater social interaction between ethnic groups. A true national culture will be neither a juxtaposition of different ethnic cultures, such as exists at present nor the assimilation of minorities into Malay culture. It will transcend all ethnic cultures, and include shared ways of life, shared values and a Malaysian world view.” (Sabah’s Dilemma, pp.516-517)
Despite his detractors, and despite most markedly, the antipathy of his old boss, the Tunku, towards him, Ghazali had as the foreign minister served the nation well. Steadfastly maintaining the country’s neutrality in the face of pressures from the Eastern bloc as well as the Western bloc he had garnered respect from all abroad, hence the premature reports of his demise in newspapers from as far away as Pittsburg, USA.
The book Coversations with Tunku Abdul Rahman is admittedly is a veritable mine of information regarding the formation of Malaysia from one of the architects of the federation, but some of the personal opinions expressed in the book may have to be read with the above in mind for a more balanced and objective view of our history.
ADVERTISEMENT
